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Limbrick: Lactation Intolerance

NOTE
Lactation Intolerance: Trivializing the
Struggles of Working Mothers & the Need
for a More Diverse Judiciary
Ames v. Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co., 760 F.3d 763 (8th Cir. 2014), cert.
denied, 135 S. Ct. 947 (2015).

THOMAS H. LIMBRICK*

I. INTRODUCTION
In February 2015, numerous online sources published articles about a
decision from the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit denying a
female employee’s sex discrimination claim on the basis that “men can lactate, too.”1 These articles were doing what many see as the main purpose of
digital journalism: attracting attention by way of clicks.2 However, these
*

B.A., Missouri State University, 2013; J.D. Candidate, University of Missouri
School of Law, 2016; Managing Editor, Missouri Law Review, 2015–2016. I would
like to thank Professor Rigel C. Oliveri for her guidance in class and in writing this
Note, Professors Jayne Woods and Anne Alexander for their help with the title, the
three female judges I have had the privilege of knowing personally, everyone on the
Missouri Law Review for their time and effort, and my family members for their constant support.
1. See, e.g., Caroline Bologna, Court Tosses Breastfeeding Discrimination Case
Because Men Can Lactate Too, HUFFINGTON POST (Feb. 10, 2015, 5:05 PM),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2015/02/10/ames-vs-nationwide-breastfeedingdiscrimination_n_6653418.html; David Ferguson, Woman Out of Appeals After Trial
Court Says Her Firing For Breastfeeding Not Sexist Since Men Can Lactate,
RAWSTORY (Feb. 3, 2015, 1:56 PM), http://www.rawstory.com/rs/2015/02/supremecourt-lets-stand-ruling-that-firing-woman-for-breastfeeding-not-sexist-because-mencan-lactate/; Amanda Marcotte, Breast-Feeding Mom Loses Discrimination Case
Because Men Can Lactate Too, SLATE (Feb. 4, 2015, 1:54 PM), http://www.
slate.com/blogs/xx_factor/2015/02/04/angela_ames_sex_discrimination_case_breast_
feeding_mom_loses_because_men.html; Mary Elizabeth Williams, Sorry, Guys, You
Can’t Breastfeed Too: A Legal Case Over a Breastfeeding Mother Features Argued
“Even Men Have Milk Ducts,” SALON (Feb. 5, 2015, 1:10 PM), http://www.salon.
com/2015/02/05/sorry_guys_you_cant_breastfeed_too/.
2. See Angèle Christin, When It Comes to Chasing Clicks, Journalists Say One
Thing But Feel Pressure to Do Another, NIEMANLAB (Aug. 28, 2014, 10:04 AM),
http://www.niemanlab.org/2014/08/when-it-comes-to-chasing-clicks-journalists-sayone-thing-but-feel-pressure-to-do-another/ (“Online media is made of clicks. Readers
click from one article to the next. Advertising revenue is based on the number of
unique visitors for each site. Editors always keep in mind their traffic targets to se-
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articles misled their readers by making it sound as if the Eighth Circuit relied
on that notion in its opinion.
In reality, Ames v. Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co. involved an employee who sued her employer for sex discrimination based on her struggle to
gain access to a lactation room upon her return from maternity leave.3 The
District Court for the Southern District of Iowa commented in a footnote
about Ames’s argument “that lactation is a medical condition related to her
pregnancy” and, thus, deserving of protected class status.4 The footnote stated:
[T]he Court takes judicial notice of the fact that adoptive mothers can
also breast-feed their adoptive babies. . . . Furthermore, it is a scientific fact that even men have milk ducts and the hormones responsible
for milk production. . . . Accordingly, lactation is not a physiological
condition experienced exclusively by women who have recently given
birth.5

The actual holdings of the district court and Eighth Circuit, while less ostentatious than the online attention-grabbing title “men can lactate, too,” showcase reasoning that is just as troubling.
Part II of this Note provides a brief background of the facts and the
Eighth Circuit’s ultimate holding in Ames. Part III discusses the legal history
of Title VII and legislative efforts to prohibit discrimination in the workplace.
Part IV examines the Eighth Circuit’s reasoning. Finally, Part V comments
on the supposed limited use of summary judgment in employment discrimination cases, the reasonableness of Ames’s actions, the effect of stereotypes
in employment discrimination, the role that the identity of the judiciary plays
in discrimination cases, and how this case could have been prevented by appropriate human resource (“HR”) management practices. The Eighth Circuit’s decision in Ames showcases the struggles many mothers face in the
workplace, and while these struggles start in the workplace, they can continue
into the courtroom. This Note argues that the increased presence of female
judges on the bench has played and will continue to play a positive role in the
administration of justice.

cure the survival of their publications. Writers and bloggers interpret clicks as a signal of popularity.”).
3. 760 F.3d 763, 767 (8th Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 947 (2015).
4. Ames v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., No. 4:11-cv-00359 RP-RAW, slip op. at
12–13 n.28 (S.D. Iowa Oct. 16, 2012), aff’d, 760 F.3d 763, cert. denied, 135 S. Ct.
947.
5. Id.
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II. FACTS AND HOLDING
Angela Ames sued her former employer, Nationwide Mutual Insurance
Company, for sex and pregnancy discrimination under Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 19646 and the Iowa Civil Rights Act (“ICRA”)7 after she was
unable to pump breast milk at work the day she returned from giving birth to
her second child.8 The district court granted Nationwide’s motion for summary judgment, and Ames appealed to the Eighth Circuit.9
In October 2008, Angela Ames was hired at Nationwide as a lossmitigation specialist.10 She took eight weeks of maternity leave after giving
birth to her first child in May 2009.11 Ames discovered she was pregnant
with her second child in October 2009.12 Unfortunately, Ames suffered complications with her second pregnancy, and her doctor ordered bed rest in April
2010.13 While discussing the doctor’s orders, the head of Ames’s department, Karla Neel, commented that “she never had to go on bed rest when she
was pregnant and that she never had complications with her pregnancies.”14
Ames’s immediate supervisor, Brian Brinks, also commented on her maternity leave by stating, “We’re too busy for her to take off that much work.”15
Nationwide also trained a temporary employee as Ames’s replacement during
her maternity leave.16 Ames’s second child was born prematurely in May
2010, and shortly thereafter, Nationwide informed Ames that her maternity
leave under the Family Medical Leave Act of 1993 (“FMLA”)17 would expire
on August 2.18 On June 16, Neel informed Ames that Nationwide had miscalculated, and that her FMLA leave would actually expire on July 12.19
Neel said Ames could take additional unpaid leave until August 2, but cautioned that this would raise “red flags” and might cause “issues down the
road.”20 Neel also offered to extend Ames’s leave by one week.21 Ames
opted for the one-week extension.22

6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.

§ 703, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2012).
IOWA CODE § 216.6 (2013).
Ames, 760 F.3d at 765.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
29 U.S.C. §§ 2601–54 (2012).
Ames, 760 F.3d at 765.
Id. at 765–66.
Id. at 766.
Id.
Id.
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Before returning to work, Ames informed a disability case manager at
Nationwide that she would need to use a pump to express breast milk while at
work, and the case manager told her that she would be able to use a lactation
room.23 Ames returned to work on July 19, 2010.24 Her son was breastfeeding every three hours, and by the time she arrived at work, she needed to
pump.25 Ames asked Neel about using a lactation room.26 However, “Neel
replied that it was not her responsibility to provide Ames with a lactation
room.”27 After asking the security desk about a lactation room, Ames was
directed to the company nurse.28 The nurse explained that Nationwide’s lactation policy required paperwork and three days to process her badge access.29 Despite information about the policy being available on Nationwide’s
intranet and at its quarterly maternity meetings, this was the first time Ames
learned of the policy.30
In order to accommodate Ames’s need to pump immediately, the nurse
asked security to grant her access “as soon as possible.”31 In the meantime,
the nurse suggested using a wellness room as a temporary solution; however,
the nurse warned Ames of possible contamination of her breast milk if exposed to germs.32 Ames had to wait to use the wellness room because someone else was occupying it; while she waited, Ames discussed her work with
her supervisor, Brinks.33 Brinks told Ames that she would have two weeks to
complete her work, which had not been completed during her maternity
leave, or else she would face disciplinary action.34 Again, Ames sought help
from her department head in finding a room to pump, and, again, Neel refused to provide help.35 Neel then handed a pen and piece of paper to Ames
and said, “You know, I think it’s best that you go home to be with your babies,” and then told Ames how to write her resignation letter.36
Ames alleged in her complaint that she was forced to resign because of
“the unavailability of a lactation room, ‘her urgent need to express milk,’ and
Nationwide’s ‘unrealistic and unreasonable expectations about her work production.’”37 Nationwide argued that there was no genuine dispute of material

23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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fact, and that Ames failed to show constructive discharge.38 The district court
agreed with Nationwide and granted its motion for summary judgment.39
Among other things, the district court found that Neel’s comment that Ames
“go home to be with [her] babies” was not evidence of sex discrimination, but
rather was “based on Ames’s gender-neutral status as a new parent.”40
Ames appealed to the Eighth Circuit, which affirmed the district court’s
ruling.41 The Eighth Circuit held that when a plaintiff acts unreasonably by
failing to provide his or her employer with an opportunity to remedy a problem and quitting on the same day as the alleged unlawful employment practice, he or she has not demonstrated constructive discharge and the employer
will not be liable under federal or state anti-discrimination law.42

II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
At common law, employment relationships were “at-will,” and an employer could refuse to hire or discharge a person for any – or no – reason at
all.43 During the Reconstruction era, Congress passed statutes attempting to
implement the Civil War Amendments: the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments.44 One such statute was the Civil Rights Act of 1866,
which established that all citizens, regardless of color, were entitled to the
same rights in every state, including the right to contract.45 The Supreme
Court of the United States, however, found that the protections of the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments required a state actor and effectively
nullified the statute.46 By 1963, twenty-two states enacted statutes that barred
racial discrimination in private employment.47 These state statutes largely
failed to include effective enforcement mechanisms, which laid the groundwork for a national policy change.48

38. Id. at 766–67.
39. Id. at 767.
40. Ames v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., No. 4:11-cv-00359 RP-RAW, slip op. at

18 (S.D. Iowa Oct. 16, 2012) (emphasis added), aff’d, 760 F.3d 763, cert. denied, 135
S. Ct. 947 (2015).
41. Ames, 760 F.3d at 769.
42. Id.
43. JOEL WM. FRIEDMAN, THE LAW OF EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION 1 (9th ed.
2013).
44. Id. at 9.
45. Ch. 31, 14 Stat. 27 (reenacted by Enforcement Act of 1870, ch. 114, § 18, 16
Stat. 140, 144 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981–82 (2012))); see
FRIEDMAN, supra note 43, at 10.
46. See Hodges v. United States, 203 U.S. 1, 18–20 (1906); FRIEDMAN, supra
note 43, at 10–11.
47. FRIEDMAN, supra note 43, at 15.
48. Id.
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Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was enacted to prevent employment discrimination nationally.49 Specifically, Title VII prohibits covered entities, including employers,50 from discriminating on the basis of five
protected classifications: race, color, religion, national origin, and sex.51 The
term “employer” has a broad statutory definition: “a person engaged in an
industry affecting commerce who has fifteen or more employees for each
working day in each of twenty or more calendar weeks in the current or preceding calendar year, and any agent of such a person.”52 Section 703 makes
it an unlawful employment practice for an employer “to fail or refuse to hire
or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of
employment.”53 The Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978 amended Title
VII’s definition of sex-based discrimination to include decisions based on
“pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions.”54
Title VII cases fall into one of two categories: disparate treatment or
disparate impact.55 Disparate treatment is intentional discrimination against
similarly situated persons because of a protected characteristic, while disparate impact involves facially neutral practices that have disproportionately
negative effects on protected classes.56 To evaluate claims alleging discrimination, courts apply the burden-shifting analysis espoused in the 1973 case of
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green.57 First, the plaintiff must establish a
prima facie case of discrimination by the employer by showing: “(1) she is a
member of a protected group; (2) she was qualified for her position; (3) she
was discharged; and (4) the discharge occurred under circumstances giving
rise to an inference of discrimination.’”58 By establishing a prima facie case,
the plaintiff creates a presumption of discrimination that the employer can
rebut by offering any “clear and reasonably specific” nondiscriminatory rea49. See § 701, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (2012); FRIEDMAN, supra note 43, at 17–18.
50. Title VII deals with actions by employers, employment agencies, and labor

unions. § 703, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2. Since this Note is only concerned with actions
by an employer, there will be no further discussion of how Title VII applies to employment agencies and labor unions.
51. § 703(a), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a). Title VII also created the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) to interpret its provisions. § 705, 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-4.
52. § 701, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e. Courts have held that “employer” should be liberally construed. See, e.g., Baker v. Stuart Broad. Co., 560 F.2d 389, 392 (8th Cir.
1977).
53. § 703(a), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a).
54. § 701(k), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k).
55. Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557, 577 (2009).
56. See id. at 577–78.
57. 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
58. Elam v. Regions Fin. Corp., 601 F.3d 873, 879 (8th Cir. 2010) (quoting
Rodgers v. U.S. Bank, N.A., 417 F.3d 845, 850 (8th Cir. 2005), abrogated on other
grounds by Torgerson v. City of Rochester, 643 F.3d 1031 (8th Cir. 2011)).
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son for its decision.59 Finally, the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to prove
that the employer’s proffered nondiscriminatory reason is pretextual and that
the employment decision, in fact, violates Title VII.60 Accordingly, a plaintiff can survive summary judgment by either producing direct evidence that a
reasonable fact finder could find discriminatory animus or establishing a prima facie case under McDonnell.61
Discharge of an employee is one of the most obvious employment decisions covered by Title VII.62 However, an employee who quits can claim that
the employer constructively discharged him or her.63 In order to prove he or
she was constructively discharged, “[A]n employee must show that the employer deliberately created intolerable working conditions with the intention
of forcing [him or] her to quit.”64 The employee can prove the employer’s
intent either by direct evidence or by evidence that the employer could reasonably foresee that its actions would cause the employee to quit.65 To successfully argue constructive discharge, the employee must give the employer
a “reasonable opportunity to resolve a problem before quitting.”66
It was in this legal context that the Eighth Circuit addressed the facts of
Ames and granted Nationwide’s motion for summary judgment on Ames’s
claims of sex and pregnancy discrimination.

IV. INSTANT DECISION
In the instant case, the Eighth Circuit analyzed Ames’s claims under Title VII.67 Rather than claim that one specific event created a constructive
discharge, Ames argued that numerous actions by Nationwide effectively
forced her to resign.68 Ames cited negative comments about her pregnancies
made by her supervisor and department head, the miscalculation of her maternity leave, and the requirement that she return to work sooner than she had
planned.69 Ames also cited the three-day waiting period to gain badge access
59. Tex. Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 258 (1981).
60. Elam, 601 F.3d at 879.
61. Ames v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 760 F.3d 763, 767 (8th Cir. 2014), cert.

denied, 135 S. Ct. 947 (2015).
62. See Civil Rights Act of 1964, tit. VII, § 703(a)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1)
(2012).
63. See Alvarez v. Des Moines Bolt Supply, Inc., 626 F.3d 410, 418 (8th Cir.
2010).
64. Ames, 760 F.3d at 767 (quoting Alvarez, 626 F.3d at 418).
65. Id. at 768 (quoting Sanders v. Lee Cty. Sch. Dist. No. 1, 669 F.3d 888, 893
(8th Cir. 2012)).
66. Id. (quoting Sanders, 669 F.3d at 893).
67. Id. at 767 (“Because Ames presents no separate arguments under the ICRA,
we analyze her ICRA claims together with her Title VII claims under the same analytical framework used for Title VII claims.”).
68. Id. at 768.
69. Id.
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to the lactation room, as well as the fact that her supervisor only gave her two
weeks to catch up on work that had not been completed – despite the presence of a trained replacement.70 Finally, Ames argued that her department
head effectively discharged her by refusing to help her find a place to pump
and saying, “I think it’s best that you go home to be with your babies.”71
Additionally, by the time she resigned she “was in considerable physical
pain,” as she had gone more than five hours without pumping.72
Contrary to Ames’s argument, the Eighth Circuit believed that Nationwide’s actions demonstrated its desire to maintain an employment relationship with Ames by trying to accommodate her needs.73 Although Nationwide
miscalculated Ames’s FMLA leave, Ames’s department head gave her another week of maternity leave “to ameliorate the impact of its mistake.”74 Nationwide required all nursing mothers to file the same paperwork and wait the
same three-day period.75 Because Ames could not gain immediate access to
the lactation room, the company nurse suggested she use a wellness room
once it became available.76 The Eighth Circuit believed: “Ames had an obligation not to jump to the conclusion that the attempt would not work and that
her only reasonable option was to resign.”77 Additionally, the court held that
her immediate supervisor’s expectations for Ames’s completion of her work
were not unreasonable: The loss-mitigation department merely required timely completion of all work by all employees.78 By treating all nursing mothers
and loss-mitigation specialists alike, the court ruled, Nationwide was seeking
to enforce its policies and not intending to force Ames to resign.79 The
Eighth Circuit also believed that Ames was unreasonable for failing to use
Nationwide’s channels of communication to resolve her concerns.80
The Eighth Circuit rejected Ames’s argument that it should adopt the
Seventh Circuit’s analysis of constructive discharge in non-hostile work environments.81 In EEOC v. University of Chicago Hospitals,82 the Seventh Circuit enumerated two ways to prove constructive discharge: the existence of
unbearable working conditions or “[w]hen an employer acts in a manner so as
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 769.
Id. at 768.
Id.
Id. at 769 (“Nationwide’s Compliance Statement, of which Ames was aware,
provides: ‘If you have reason to believe that Nationwide is not in compliance with the
law, contact your local HR professional, the Office of Ethics, or the Office of Associate Relations to report the circumstances immediately.’”).
81. Id.
82. 276 F.3d 326 (7th Cir. 2002).
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to have communicated to a reasonable employee that she will be terminated,
and the plaintiff employee resigns, the employer’s conduct may amount to
constructive discharge.”83 Even if the Eighth Circuit were to adopt the second form, it believed that Ames would fail because she would still be required to show her working conditions became intolerable.84 Ames would
also need to demonstrate that she would have been fired immediately if she
did not resign, which the Eighth Circuit did not believe was supported by the
facts.85
Finally, the Eighth Circuit agreed with Nationwide that Ames waived a
claim for actual discharge because she failed to raise the argument in the district court.86 Absent limited exceptions,87 an appellate court will not evaluate
issues, arguments, or theories not presented to the court below.88 Ames did
not believe she waived a claim for actual discharge because in Schneider v.
Jax Shack, Inc.,89 the Eighth Circuit held that the district court should have
answered the “antecedent question of whether there had been an actual discharge” before deciding whether there was a constructive discharge.90 Ames
argued that since her complaint and opposition brief to Nationwide’s motion
for summary judgment established facts showing actual discharge, the district
court should have decided whether she was actually discharged.91 The Eighth
Circuit disagreed and distinguished this case from Schneider, because the
parties in Schneider did not brief the issue to the district court.92 The Eighth
Circuit held that the district court “should have addressed whether there had
been actual discharge because its findings of fact suggested that an actual
discharge had occurred.”93 Since Ames had adequate opportunities to brief
the issue and did not claim actual discharge to the district court, the Eighth
Circuit ruled that she waived the claim.94

83. Ames, 760 F.3d at 769 (alteration in original) (quoting Univ. of Chi. Hosps.,
276 F.3d at 332).
84. Id. (citing Chapin v. Fort–Rohr Motors, Inc., 621 F.3d 673, 679 (7th Cir.
2010)).
85. Id. at 769–70.
86. Id. at 770.
87. Such exceptions include “where the proper resolution is beyond any doubt”
or “where injustice might otherwise result.” Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 121.
However, Ames did not argue either. Ames, 760 F.3d at 770.
88. Ames, 760 F.3d at 770 (quoting Wright v. Newman, 735 F.2d 1073, 1076
(8th Cir. 1984)).
89. 794 F.2d 383 (8th Cir. 1986).
90. Ames, 760 F.3d at 770 (quoting Schneider, 794 F.2d at 384).
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id. (citing Schneider, 794 F.2d at 384).
94. Id. at 771.
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V. COMMENT
In recent years, employers and legislatures have made efforts to help
working mothers pursue their careers and fulfill their maternal responsibilities. The Nursing Mothers Provision in the Patient Protection and Affordable
Care Act requires covered employers to provide:
(A) a reasonable break time for an employee to express breast milk for
her nursing child for 1 year after the child’s birth each time such employee has need to express the milk; and
(B) a place, other than a bathroom, that is shielded from view and free
from intrusion from coworkers and the public, which may be used by
an employee to express breast milk.95

According to an annual survey of HR professionals, 28% of organizations,
including Nationwide, offered on-site lactation rooms for female employees
in 2014.96 Despite this progress, the existence of a lactation room means little
to a nursing employee if she has difficulty accessing it or will suffer negative
repercussions for using it.
The Eighth Circuit’s decision in Ames demonstrates the struggles working mothers still face. The unjustly expanded use of summary judgment in
employment discrimination cases is a major hurdle for a female employee, as
one – typically male – judge is the sole decision maker on the reasonableness
of her actions. Ever-present sex stereotypes about the role of women in the
workforce and the sex of the judges affect the outcomes of the cases. Finally,
despite the progressive step in providing a lactation room for female employees, HR failures like the ones in Ames continue to prevent female employees
from balancing work and family life.

A. Summary Judgment in Employment Discrimination Cases
Summary judgment has been a fundamental part of Anglo-American jurisprudence since the nineteenth century.97 It is a key method courts use to
remove meritless cases from clogged dockets; however, courts may be overusing it as a quick method to clear their caseloads.98 Employment discrimination cases, in particular, “are inherently fact-based and often depend on inferences rather than on direct evidence,” and because of these reasons, the Supreme Court of Missouri believes summary judgment should “seldom be used
95. 29 U.S.C. § 207(r)(1) (2012).
96. SOC’Y FOR HUMAN RES. MGMT., 2014 EMPLOYEE BENEFITS: AN OVERVIEW
OF EMPLOYEE BENEFITS OFFERINGS IN THE U.S. 32 (June 2014), http://www.shrm.org/
Research/SurveyFindings/Documents/14-0301%20Beneftis_Report_TEXT_FNL.pdf.
97. FED. R. CIV. P. 56 advisory committee’s notes.
98. See Theresa M. Beiner, The Misuse of Summary Judgment in Hostile Environment Cases, 34 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 71, 133 (1999).
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in employment discrimination cases.”99 For example, the only way for a fact
finder to truly determine whether a hostile working environment existed is to
hear testimony from parties and witnesses.100 Summary judgment essentially
makes the “reasonable person” standard meaningless, because it “is a standard that involves local norms of appropriate behavior that are better judged by
a jury of the plaintiff’s peers than a single judge.”101 Even if the jury eventually finds in favor of the defendant, “[T]he plaintiff deserves a chance to explain his or her position and describe the environment in which he or she was
forced to work.”102 Ames was entitled to present her case to a jury who could
have easily found her actions reasonable.

B. Reasonableness of Ames’s Actions
When a plaintiff alleges constructive discharge, “The inquiry is objective: Did working conditions become so intolerable that a reasonable person
in the employee’s position would have felt compelled to resign?”103 It is this
crucial standard, which the district court and Eighth Circuit failed to apply,
that should have allowed Ames’s case to go to a jury.
Despite the statements by the district court that “lactation is not a physiological condition experienced exclusively by women who have recently
given birth,”104 it is the “normal physiological state” for women who have
recently given birth.105 When a woman gives birth, various hormones initiate
the natural process of lactogenesis (production of breast milk), which is normally sustained by regular breastfeeding.106 During her first few months of
lactation, “A breastfeeding mother is susceptible to health issues such as en99. Daugherty v. City of Maryland Heights, 231 S.W.3d 814, 818 (Mo. 2007)
(en banc).
100. Beiner, supra note 98, at 75.
101. Id. at 133–34.
102. Id. at 134.
103. Pa. State Police v. Suders, 542 U.S. 129, 141 (2004) (emphasis added).
104. Ames v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., No. 4:11-cv-00359 RP-RAW, slip op. at
12–13 n.28 (S.D. Iowa Oct. 16, 2012), aff’d, 760 F.3d 763 (8th Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 947 (2015).
105. Kathleen A. Marinelli et al., Breastfeeding Support for Mothers in Workplace Employment or Educational Settings, 8 BREASTFEEDING MED. 137, 137
(2013), http://www.bfmed.org/Media/Files/Documents/pdf/Statements/ABM_position
_on_mothersinworkplace_2013.pdf. By contrast, and to address the district court’s
comments that caused an online sensation, lactation is not the normal physiological
state for non-postpartum adoptive mothers or the rare examples of men lactating “under extreme circumstances.” Nikhil Swaminathan, Strange but True: Males Can
Lactate, SCI. AM. (Sept. 6, 2007), http://www.scientificamerican.com/article/strangebut-true-males-can-lactate/ (citing examples of men lactating as a result of stimulation
of the nipples, medicine that disrupts normal male hormones, and starvation).
106. Marinelli et al., supra note 105, at 137 (“Placental lactogen, progesterone,
estrogen, and prolactin all play important roles in achieving a continuous production
of maternal milk.”).
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gorgement, mastitis, plugged ducts, and abscesses if her infant is not breastfeeding frequently or well or she is not removing milk effectively while separated from her infant.”107
Due to the physiological consequences of prolonged periods of time
when a lactating mother is unable to express breast milk, by the time Ames
went back to seek help from her department head, she was experiencing “increasinglysevere [sic] physical pain” caused by the engorgement of her
breasts.108 The physical side effects caused by not pumping create more than
a mere “desire” to pump, as stated by the district court.109 This pain could
cause a reasonable person in Ames’s position to react in the manner she did
and refuse to wait more than the five hours she had already been waiting
while trying to find a room to pump. Also, requiring a three-day waiting
period to use the lactation room is questionable: Ames would have had to
come in three days earlier to fill out paperwork, which she did not know she
had to do after her discussion with the disability case manager. Despite these
facts, the district court and Eighth Circuit erroneously held that Ames was not
constructively discharged because of her failure to provide her employer with
a “reasonable opportunity” to resolve her issues.110

C. Stereotypes
Congress passed Title VII in part to eradicate the role that sex stereotypes play in the workplace.111 As the Supreme Court stated in Nevada Department of Human Resources v. Hibbs, “[T]he faultline [sic] between work
and family [is] precisely where sex-based overgeneralization has been and
remains strongest . . . ,”112 and the Pregnancy Discrimination Act was enacted
to confront the stereotype “that women’s family duties trump those of the
workplace.”113 An employer’s objection to a female employee wishing to
fulfill her maternal duties may actually be “a veiled assertion that mothers,
because they are women, are insufficiently devoted to work, or that work and

107. Id. (emphasis added).
108. Plaintiff/Appellant’s Brief at 38, Ames, 760 F.3d 763 (No. 12-3780), 2013

WL 431683, at *38.
109. Ames, slip op. at 12–13 n.28.
110. Id. at 33–34; Ames, 760 F.3d at 769.
111. See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 251 (1989) (quoting L.A.
Dep’t of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 707 n.13 (1978)) (“As for the
legal relevance of sex stereotyping, we are beyond the day when an employer could
evaluate employees by assuming or insisting that they matched the stereotype associated with their group, for ‘[i]n forbidding employers to discriminate against individuals because of their sex, Congress intended to strike at the entire spectrum of disparate
treatment of men and women resulting from sex stereotypes.’”).
112. 538 U.S. 721, 738 (2003).
113. Id. at 748.
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motherhood are incompatible, [and] such treatment is gender based and is
properly addressed under Title VII.”114
The words of Ames’s department head, that “it’s best that [Ames] go
home to be with [her] babies,”115 are a clear example of the sex stereotype
Congress intended to eliminate by enacting the Pregnancy Discrimination
Act. Ames was pressured to resign because her employer, through the actions of the department head, believed that needing access to a lactation room
was proof that Ames was unwilling or unable to be both a mother and an employee.116 The callous treatment Ames experienced on her first day back at
work from maternity leave culminated in Neel’s comment that was “laden
with stereotypical notions about the ability of a mother to also be a committed
employee.”117 It is this “illegal sex stereotype that women would prioritize
child care responsibilities over paid employment”118 that the Eighth Circuit
failed to consider when it erroneously affirmed the district court’s grant of
summary judgment.
Also in Ames, the Eighth Circuit included information regarding Ames’s
previous pregnancy and maternity leave. Her first pregnancy was irrelevant
to the question of whether Nationwide discriminated against her after her
second pregnancy. Inclusion of such information could imply that Nationwide and the Eighth Circuit thought that Ames was taking too much leave
and was not fully committed to her work, which would further demonstrate
how the identity of judges plays a crucial role in the adjudication of employment discrimination cases.

D. Identity of the Judiciary
Each person’s, including a judge’s, identity “[is] the result of [his or her]
race, ethnic background, nationality, socioeconomic situation, gender, sexual
orientation, religion, and ideology.”119 Ideally, judges use the facts and evidence of a case before them, in the context of legal precedent, to reach their
decisions; however, “[R]egardless of conscious or avowed biases and prejudices, most people, no matter how well-educated or personally committed to

114. Brief for ACLU as Amici Curiae Supporting Appellant’s Petition for Rehearing en Banc at 7–8, Ames, 760 F.3d 763 (No. 12-3780), 2014 WL 1879148, at *7–8
(quoting Plaetzer v. Borton Auto., Inc., No. Civ.02-3089, 2004 WL 2066770, at *10
n.3 (D. Minn. Aug. 13, 2004)).
115. Ames, 760 F.3d at 766.
116. See Plaintiff/Appellant’s Brief, supra note 108, at *56, *58.
117. Id.
118. Lewis v. Heartland Inns of Am., L.L.C., 591 F.3d 1033, 1039 (8th Cir.
2010).
119. Nicole E. Negowetti, Navigating the Pitfalls of Implicit Bias: A Cognitive
Science Primer for Civil Litigators, 4 ST. MARY’S J. ON LEGAL MALPRACTICE &
ETHICS 278, 300 (2014), http://www.stmaryslawjournal.org/pdfs/7Negowetti_
Final_Germano_Clean.pdf.
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impartiality, harbor some implicit biases.”120 An implicit bias is an unconscious mental attitude – positive or negative – that a person holds toward a
person, group, or thing.121 Psychologists believe that implicit biases “develop
over the course of a lifetime beginning at a very early age through exposure
to direct and indirect messages.”122
Judges’ implicit biases may, and seemingly do, lead to the overwhelming majority of employment discrimination cases that end with a grant of
summary judgment in favor of employers.123 In Ashcroft v. Iqbal, the Supreme Court of the United States directed judges to “draw on [their] judicial
experience and common sense” when determining whether a plaintiff has
stated a “plausible claim for relief.”124 However, “By placing the judge’s
own ‘common sense’ at the heart of the decision whether to dismiss a discrimination claim at an early stage of litigation, the Iqbal standard risks increasing the impact of a judge’s implicit biases on the outcome of employment disputes.”125
What a reasonable female employee would find severely offensive
might be discounted by a male judge, because “a judge’s gender will affect
120. Id. See Nancy Gertner & Melissa Hart, Employment Law: Implicit Bias in
Employment Litigation, in IMPLICIT RACIAL BIAS ACROSS THE LAW 94 (Justin D.
Levinson & Robert J. Smith eds., 2012) (“Judges like to think they are ‘free of bias,
even-handed, and open-minded. Yet research on implicit bias and cognitive processes teaches that they cannot be entirely free of bias any more than any other person can
be.”).
121. Understanding Implicit Bias, KIRWAN INST., http://kirwaninstitute.osu.edu/
research/understanding-implicit-bias/ (last visited Nov. 23, 2015) (“Residing deep in
the subconscious, these biases are different from known biases that individuals may
choose to conceal for the purposes of social and/or political correctness. Rather,
implicit biases are not accessible through introspection.”).
122. Id. (“In addition to early life experiences, the media and news programming
are often-cited origins of implicit associations.”).
123. See Gertner & Hart, supra note 120, at 89 (footnote omitted) (“Recent studies show that more than 70 percent of summary judgment motions in employment
discrimination cases are granted. Once again, the attitudes of judges considering
these cases – the biases and assumptions they bring to their analysis – may be determinative.”); Negowetti, supra note 119, at 308 (quoting Jill D. Weinberg & Laura
Beth Nielsen, Examining Empathy: Discrimination, Experience, and Judicial Decisionmaking, 85 S. CAL. L. REV. 313, 346 (2012) (“[W]hite judges are much more
likely to dispense with employment-discrimination cases during the summary judgment stage than are minority judges, and white judges discard cases that involve minority plaintiffs ‘at a much higher rate than cases involving white plaintiffs.’ Although there are many ways to explain this trend, judges’ implicit biases are at least
partly to blame.”).
124. 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009).
125. Gertner & Hart, supra note 120, at 88 (“Indeed, there is little difference between judicial ‘common sense’ and the very cognitive processes that social scientists
have identified as producing stereotyping and bias. When the legal standard itself
incorporates reliance on that kind of judgment, it places corresponding importance on
the identities of the judges themselves.”).
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her or his understanding of the significance of allegations in gender discrimination claims.”126 Multiple factors may help male judges, in particular, recognize and overcome their implicit biases, including the judges’ families.
Research shows that male judges who have at least one daughter are more
likely to find in favor of female plaintiffs on gender related issues.127 The
presence of female judges also has an effect because:
[W]omen judges can bring an understanding of the impact of the law
on the lives of women and girls to the bench, and enrich courts’ understanding of how best to realize the intended purpose and effect of
the law that the courts are charged with applying.128

Particularly, one study found that female plaintiffs raising allegations of sex
discrimination or sexual harassment “were at least twice as likely to win”
their case if the appellate panel included a female judge.129 In Ames, the male
district court judge130 and the all-male panel for the Eighth Circuit131 were
undoubtedly influenced by their implicit biases and were unable to fully understand Ames’s position.
One way to decrease this inherent injustice is for more female judges to
be appointed at all levels of the judiciary.132 Approximately one-fourth of the
126. Id. at 94. The same reasoning applies to white judges ruling in cases involving alleged racial discrimination against an employee who is a member of a racial
minority group. Id. Additionally, male judges’ implicit biases may have played a role
in the delayed acceptance of evidence of Battered Woman Syndrome in criminal
homicide cases against female defendants who killed their abusers. See Kristen L.
Stallion, Law Summary, No Less a Victim: A Call to Governor Nixon to Grant Clemency to Two Missouri Women, 81 MO. L. REV. (forthcoming 2016).
127. Adam Glynn & Maya Sen, Identifying Judicial Empathy: Does Having
Daughters Cause Judges To Rule For Women’s Issues?, 59 AM. J. POL. SCI. 37, 37,
45–47 (2015), http://scholar.harvard.edu/files/msen/files/daughters.pdf. This study
does not suggest that merely by having a daughter a male judge will always find in
favor of female plaintiffs; rather, “[T]he impact of having daughters being a positive
and significant predictor of increased feminist voting under all model specifications.”
Id. at 47.
128. Women in the Federal Judiciary: Still A Long Way to Go, NAT’L WOMEN’S
L. CTR. 1 (Nov. 18, 2015), http://nwlc.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/10/JudgesCourts
WomeninFedJudFactSheet-November2015-Update.pdf.
129. Race & Gender of Judges Make Enormous Differences in Rulings, Studies
Find, A.B.A. J. (Feb. 7, 2010, 12:20 AM), http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/
race_gender_of_judges_make_enormous_differences_in_rulings_studies_find_aba.
130. The district court judge was Judge Robert W. Pratt. Ames v. Nationwide
Mut. Ins. Co., No. 4:11-cv-00359 RP-RAW, slip op. at 42 (S.D. Iowa Oct. 16, 2012),
aff’d, 760 F.3d 763 (8th Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 947 (2015).
131. The panel of judges of the Eighth Circuit consisted of Judges Roger Leland
Wollman, Steven M. Colloton, and Raymond W. Gruender. Ames, 760 F.3d at 764.
132. The same can be said about the need to appoint more judges of color and
different sexual orientations, but that concern is beyond the scope of this Note.
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federal bench is female.133 Having a more diverse judiciary will: “promote
public confidence and trust in a fair and objective justice system; provide
legitimacy to the judicial decision making process; validate multi-cultural
perspectives and voices; and provide role models for minority youth.”134 The
federal judiciary has experienced dramatic strides thanks to President Barack
Obama. His two appointments to the Supreme Court of the United States –
Justices Sonia Sotomayor and Elena Kagan – joined Justice Ruth Bader
Ginsberg to make the Court the most gender diverse it has ever been.135 President Obama has already appointed more female judges than any previous
president.136 While that number is still only 42% of his judicial appointments, it is a strong step in the right direction compared to previous presidents.137 State courts as a whole are more diverse than the federal courts, but
only slightly. In 2012, 27% of state court judges were women.138 Only 21%
of Missouri judges were women, which fell below the national average of
26%.139
Another way to help mitigate the effects of judges’ implicit biases is
through mandatory education and training programs. The National Center for
133. Women in the Federal Judiciary, supra note 128, at 2 n.2 (“Approximately
25% of sitting federal Article III judges are women; close to 33% of active federal
Article III judges are women.”).
134. LAWYERS’ COMM. FOR CIVIL RIGHTS UNDER LAW, ANSWERING THE CALL
FOR A MORE DIVERSE JUDICIARY: A REVIEW OF STATE JUDICIAL SELECTION MODELS
AND THEIR IMPACT ON CREATING A MORE DIVERSE JUDICIARY 2 (June 2005),
https://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/sites/default/files/answering_20050923.pdf.
135. See Women in the Federal Judiciary, supra note 128, at 1. If you ask Justice
Ruth Bader Ginsberg when there will be enough female judges on the Court, her
answer is: “[W]hen there are nine.” Igor Bobic, Ruth Bader Ginsburg Has Perfect
Response When Asked About Women On The Supreme Court, HUFFINGTON POST
(Feb. 17, 2015, 1:59 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2015/02/07/ruth-baderginsburg-women-supreme-court_n_6636328.html. Interestingly, the Court is now
comprised of six Roman Catholics and three Jews: the first time in U.S. history that
there has not been a single Protestant justice. See Chris Weigant, Supreme Court’s
Lack of Religious Diversity, HUFFINGTON POST (June 30, 2014, 9:01 PM),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/chris-weigant/supreme-courts-lack-of-re_b_
5545989.html.
136. Women in the Federal Judiciary, supra note 128, at 1 (noting that President
Obama has appointed 132 female judges since taking office).
137. This is the First Time Our Judicial Pool Has Been This Diverse, WHITE
HOUSE (Dec. 17, 2014), https://www.whitehouse.gov/share/judicial-nominations
(22% of President George W. Bush’s appointments and 29% of President Bill Clinton’s appointment were women).
138. 2012 Representation of United States State Court Women Judges, NAT’L
ASS’N WOMEN JUDGES, http://www.nawj.org/us_state_court_statistics_2012.asp (last
visited Nov. 23, 2015). This total percentage includes 32% of final appellate jurisdiction courts, 32% of intermediate appellate jurisdiction courts, 25% of general jurisdiction courts, and 31% of limited and special jurisdiction courts. Id.
139. Id. As of 2012, Idaho had the lowest percentage of female judges (12%) and
Montana had the highest (42%). Id.
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State Courts (“NCSC”) piloted a project in 2012 designed to educate judges
and court staff about the nature of implicit biases.140 The project offered voluntary presentations and training to judges, attorneys, clerks, court professionals, and support staff in three states: California, Minnesota, and North
Dakota.141 Due to the finite nature of the pilot project, NCSC was unable to
record long-term impacts of the training; however, the short-term results
showed that participants were overwhelmingly satisfied with the program’s
content and applicability.142 This project shows that quality programs can
have an impact on the judicial system, and it should become the model for a
mandatory educational and training program for all judges across the country.

E. HR Failures
Perhaps the most tragic aspect of Ames’s case is that it did not need to
happen. Nationwide is among the minority of employers that provide on-site
lactation rooms for female employees.143 However, having a room available
is clearly not enough to prevent the issues mothers face when returning to
work.
More than half of all working mothers return to work within four
months of giving birth.144 A main factor for this speedy return is the United
States’ “stingy” family leave policies.145 The United States is the only developed country that does not mandate paid maternity leave.146 Between 2006
and 2008, less than half of all working mothers were able to take paid leave

140. PAMELA M. CASEY ET AL., NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, HELPING COURTS
ADDRESS IMPLICIT BIAS: RESOURCES FOR EDUCATION 6–8 (2012),
http://www.ncsc.org/~/media/Files/PDF/Topics/
Gender%20and%20Racial%20Fairness/IB_report_033012.ashx.
141. Id. at 6.
142. Id. at 10, 14, 18.
143. See SOC’Y FOR HUMAN RES. MGMT., supra note 96, at 32.
144. Christopher Ingraham, Today’s Moms Are Working Later Into Their Pregnancies — And Going Back to Work Earlier Too, WASH. POST WONKBLOG (Apr. 1,
2015),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog/wp/2015/04/01/stingypolicies-mean-american-women-are-taking-less-maternity-leave-than-ever/.
See
Figure 1 infra p. 1108.
145. Ingraham, supra note 144.
146. Id.; Susanna Kim, US Is Only Industrialized Nation Without Paid Maternity
Leave, ABC NEWS (May 6, 2015, 6:02 PM), http://abcnews.go.com/Business/usindustrialized-nation-paid-maternity-leave/story?id=30852419 (“[T]he U.S. is only
one of three countries in the world that don’t offer paid maternity leave . . . . The
other two countries are Papua New Guinea and Suriname.”). While five states require
paid maternity leave – California, Hawaii, New Jersey, New York, and Rhode Island
– there is no national mandate. INT’L LABOUR ORG., MATERNITY AND PATERNITY AT
WORK: LAW AND PRACTICE ACROSS THE WORLD 142 n.25 (2014),
http://ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---dgreports/---dcomm/--publ/documents/publication/wcms_242615.pdf.
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after giving birth, while 37% resorted to unpaid leave.147 Between those
same years, 15% were still able to use some other form of leave, including
disability, but 9% quit or were fired.148
The percentage of mothers returning to work so soon after giving birth
and the number of mothers who breastfeed their babies was 77% in 2013,149
which should require companies to have adequate and reasonable lactation
policies. For example, Nationwide’s policy required an employee to wait
three days for access to the lactation room because of the processing time for
paperwork and badge access.150 Assuming that the process could not be done
in less time, the disability case manager should have told Ames about the
delay when she called before returning to work. Additionally, it would be
better for companies to instruct their HR managers to ensure that pregnant
employees are fully informed about the policy before returning to work and
not leave it up to the employees to figure it out on their own.
It is clear that more companies should develop lactation policies, both
for the benefit of the individual employees and the company:“[E]mployees of
companies providing lactation support say they feel more productive and
loyal to the company.”151

VI. CONCLUSION
Although the Eighth Circuit’s actual reasoning in Ames did not mention
the district court’s footnote that sparked online controversy, the court’s holding reveals serious concerns facing working mothers. The overuse of summary judgment has become an almost impassable barrier to female employees claiming sex discrimination as courts fail to properly evaluate a plaintiff’s
reasonable actions because of ingrained stereotypes. On her first day back
from maternity leave, Ames was faced with unnecessary obstructions while
suffering severe physical pain from her need to pump. These obstacles could
have been prevented had Nationwide’s lactation policy and Ames’s supervisors been more reasonable. The male judges who decided her case victimized
her again by failing to see the reasonableness of her actions and the discrimination by Nationwide. This failure demonstrates why more female judges are
needed. According to Judge Mary Rhodes Russell of the Supreme Court of
Missouri, “[I]t’s important for the courts to look like the people they repre-

147. Ingraham, supra note 144.
148. Id.
149. Breastfeeding Report Card 2013, CDC (2013), http://www.cdc.gov/

breastfeeding/pdf/2013breastfeedingreportcard.pdf.
150. Ames v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 760 F.3d 763, 766 (8th Cir. 2014), cert.
denied, 135 S. Ct. 947 (2015).
151. Stephen Miller, Ensure Compliance with Reform Law’s Lactation Room
Requirements: Best practices sought for interactive database, SOC’Y FOR HUM.
RESOURCE
MGMT.
(Mar.
8,
2012),
http://www.shrm.org/hrdisciplines/
benefits/articles/pages/lactationroom.aspx.
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sent. I think that if the courts don’t have diversity we lose our strength.”152
The concerns raised in Ames and addressed in this Note will hopefully continue to be addressed by the increasing diversification of the bench, which
“makes for a stronger court.”153

152. Collin Reischman, Behind the bench: Q&A with Missouri Supreme Court
Justice Mary Rhodes Russell, MO. TIMES (Aug. 13, 2013), http://themissouri
times.com/6082/behind-the-bench-qa-with-missouri-supreme-court-justice-maryrhodes-russell/.
153. Id.
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APPENDIX
Figure 1

Christopher Ingraham, Today’s Moms Are Working Later Into Their Pregnancies —
And Going Back to Work Earlier Too, WASH. POST WONKBLOG (Apr. 1, 2015),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog/wp/2015/04/01/stingy-policiesmean-american-women-are-taking-less-maternity-leave-than-ever/.
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